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In conclusion it may be noted that at the present time the various
privileges and disqualifications surrounding the testimony of husband
and wife are being diminished with surprising rapidity by frequent
code amendments and by judicial decisions. An entire abolition of these
privileges and disqualifications, of doubtful benefit, should be effected.
This will probably come about in time through judicial decisions since
flexibility aid capacity for growth are the peculiar boasts of the com-
mon law. Sutherland, J., aptly puts it when he says, "the fundamental
basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest-if they are to rest
upon reason-is their adaptation to the successful development of the
truth". And reason dictates that a rule of evidence, at one time
thought indispensable to an expedient ascertainment of the truth,
should yield to the experience of a new generation, if that experience
justifies the conclusion that the old rule is fallacious.
ALBERT R. JoNEs
AUTomoImEss-THE FAmnImy PuRpos DOCTRINE IN KENTUcKy.
The Kentucky court has uniformly upheld the family purpose doc-
trine from the beginning of its adjudication in this state, either by
actual decision or by dictum. Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 388, 144 S. W.
62 (1912); Miller v. Week, 186 Ky. 552, 217 S. W. 904 (1920); Holland
v. Goode, 188 Ky. 525, 222 S. W. 950 (1920); Doss v. Monticello Blectric
Light and Power Co. & Myers, 193 Ky. 499, 236 S. W. 1046 (1922);
Sale v. Atkins, 206 Ky. 224, 267 S. W. 223 (1924); Thixton v. Palmer,
210 Ky. 838, 276 S. W. 971 (1925); Rauckhorst v. Kraut, 216 Ky. 323,
287 S. W. 895 (1926); Kennedy v. Wolf, 221 Ky. 111, 298 S. W. 188
(1927); Bradley v. Schmidt, 223 Ky. 784, 4 S. W. (2d) 703 (1928);
Malcolm v. Nunn, 226 Ky. 225, 10 S. W. (2d) 817 (1928); Buster v.
Vogel, 227 Ky. 735, 13 S. W. (2d) 1028 (1929); Steel v. Age's Adm'x,
233 Ky. 714, 26 S. W. (2d) 563 (1930); Marsee v. Bates, 235 Ky. 60,
29 S. W. (2d) 632 (1930); Wallace v. Hall, 235 Ky. 749, 32 S. W. (2d)
324 (1930); Craghead v. Halele's Adm'a', 236 Ky. 250, 32 S. W. (2d)
324 (1930); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hall, 237 Ky. 393,
35 S. W. (2d) 550 (1931); Myer's Adm'x v. Brown, 250 Ky. 64, 61 S. W.
(2d) 1052 (1933). The doctrine places liability on the owner of an
automobile, which is purchased and maintained for the pleasure of
his, or her family for negligent injuries inflicted by the vehicle while
it is being used by some member with his consent, express or implied,
on the theory that it is the owner's business to furnish pleasure for the
family. The court has based its decisions mainly on the principal and
agent, and master and servant theory. Stowe v. Morris, supra; Rauck-
horst v. Kraut, supra; Myer's Adm'x v. Brown, supra. It is preferable
to support the doctrine on the relationship of master and servant,
rather than on that of principal and agent, since a principal is liable
only for torts (expressly or impliedly) authorized, while a master is
liable for all torts committed by the servant, while engaged within the
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scope of the master's employment. Salmond on Torts p. 93. However,
the status of master and servant does not exist unless one of the fam-
ily is employed in the owner's business. It cannot be seriously con-
tended that it is the father's business or employment to furnish his
family with an automobile for their convenience and pleasure, because
it Is not looked upon as a necessary. Tanzer v. Read, 145 N. Y. Supp.
708 (1914). The word "business" generally indicates that the one en-
gaged expects to receive some benefit, financial or otherwise, even
though a person may be a servant without agreement for compensa-
tion. Spencer v. Fisher, 184 Cal. 209, 193 Pac. 255 (1920). It can
hardly be said that it is the father's business to furnish his son such
pleasures as driving at a reckless speed over a dangerous road, or
while intoxicated. A case contra to the doctrine explodes this idea
with this sly bit of sarcastic humor, "If son took his best girl riding,
prima facie it was father's little outing by proxy." Watkins v. Clark,
103 Kan. 629, 176 Pac. 131 (1918). Master and servant implies a
control exercised and an authority given and in force at the time the
injury occurs. It would scarcely cover a tort where a member of the
family Is using the car solely for his own pleasure at the time since
an agency for the sole benefit of the servant is unknown to the law.
Jones v. Cooke, 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S. E. 828 (1922). The relation of
parent and child alone is not enough to create a master and servant
status, or to make the parent liable for the child's torts committed
without his authority or consent. Linville v. Nissen, 162'N. C. 95,
77 S. E. 1096 (1913); Stowe v. Morris, supra; Doss v. Monticello Blec-
tric Light & Power Co. & Myers, supra; Sale v. Atkins, supra. Although
the child may be doing the type of act usually performed by a chauffeur
in driving the car containing other members of the family, yet, where
he is doing it for his own pleasure and not at the owner's request or
direction, he does not thereby become a servant in the true sense of the
word. .The conclusion, therefore must be reached that the owner is
simply making a gift of the use of the automobile to one of .his family,
and that a bailor and bailee relation, only, exists. It Is a well known.
principle of law that the negligence of the bailee cannot be attributed
to the bailor. Outrepa7ik v. Phelps, 73 Colo. 433, 216 Pac. 541 (1923).
Certainly this was the law before the automobile became a widely
used source of locomotion. Baker v. Haldeman, 24 Mo. 219 (1857);
Edwards v. Crump, 13 Kan. 348 (1874); Moon v. Towers, 8 C. B. (N. S.)
611 (1860). The automobile has not been regarded as an inherently
dangerous instrument, so as to cause the owner to be liable as an in-
surer, since it plays such an integral part In our daily economic life.
Boes v. Howell, 24 N. M. 142, 173 Pac. 966 (1918) Tyler v. Stephan, 163
*Ky. 770, 174 S. W.- 790 (1915); Stowe v. Morris, supra; Bradley v.
Schmidt, supra. The automobile, being a lawful means of travel, is
not a nuisance per se. Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115, 130 N. W. 336
(1911); Blair v. Broadwater, 121 Va. 301, 193 S. E. (1917); Chicago v.
Banker, 112 Ill. App. 94; Guskins v. Hancock, 156 N. C. 56. The ele-
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ments of an estoppel are not present, although one court refers to it
as a basis of liability. Hays v. Hogan, 200 S. W. 286 (1912).
One possible ground remains. This is public policy. This ground,
it is admitted, should be availed of only where no other logical theory
presents itself on which to rest liability, and weighty reasons exist
for its utilization. It is submitted that an infringement of an impor-
tant and necessary right will go unremedled, if this basis is not recog-
nized, since many of the state tribunals refuse rightly to place liability
on the master and servant relation. The frequent accidents, which occur
on account of the negligent operation of a parent's car by a member
of his family, who is likely to be financially irresponsible, should be
given a considerable amount of thought in coming to a decision on
this point. Practically, an uncollectible judgment is an empty form,
and constitutes a valueless remedy for the evil. While an automobile
is not dangerous per se, its potential danger in the hands of a careless
driver, especially a member of the family who has permission to use
the car at his own pleasure, should have an important bearing on the
result. lrittendon v. Murphy, 36 Cal. App. 803, 173 Pac. 595 (1918).
Likewise the family purpose doctrine puts the financial responsibility
of the owner behind the car, and relieves the injured party from the
difficult task of meeting the owner's claim -that at the time of the
accident the car was not being used for his pleasure or business. It
also protects the injured person as fully as if the owner were driving
the car himself, thus achieving justice in his case. For these reasons,
it seems to the writer that the advantages to be gained completely
outweigh any disadvantages that might accrue from its adoption. And
public policy has been used in other branches of the law. For instance,
the courts have refused to apply the ordinary rules of contract in
insurance cases upon the basis of this theory. Likewise the writer
is not without eminent authority for his contention in the case of the
family car, even thouih many of the cases do lip service to the empty
phrases of respondeat superior, and qui facit per alium facit Per se
without attempting to probe into the reasons underlying them. King
v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296 (1916); Hutchins v. Haffner,
63 Colo. 355, 167 Pac. 966 (1917); Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C. 213, 145
S. E. 169 (1928); Graham v. Page, 300 Il1. 40, 132 N. E. 817 (1921).
This ground of liability was enunciated in Kentucky in the case of
Kennedy v. Wolf, supra.
One important reason that is advanced for failure to adopt the
purpose doctrine is that if a remedy is to be given it should come by
way of legislative enactment. Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. 111,
115 N. E. 443 (1917). The American LaW Institute takes this view
in refusing to incorporate the doctrine in its Restatement of Agency.
Explanatory Note on Agency, Tentative Draft No. 5, Section 463, Com-
ment (c). Yet in the quarter century that this problem has been be-
fore the courts only ten states have passed any legislation whatever
on the subject. 26 Mich. Law Rev. 689. In many cases the remedy
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-given Is inadequate, because the statutes impose only limited liability,
-such as allowing a lien on the owner's car. Likewise these statutes
have been subjected to a narrow judicial construction in many in-
'stances. Also some of the statutes passed have been declared uncon-
'stitutional, because of the faulty manner in which they were drawn.
In many states where insurance is compulsory, no remedy exists such
as Is comprehended by the family purpose doctrine, because an in-
surance company is not usually liable unless the owner of the ma-
chine is liable personally. Thus it is readily seen that the remedy
*by legislation was and is, at the piesent day, generally unfitted to
handle the situation. The courts, therefore, should grant relief in
these cases until substantial and adequate laws are passed throughout
the country.
If the adoption of the family purpose doctrine is to be put on such
a ground as public policy, it must be limited strictly and narrowly so
as to grant relief in only those situations which the courts intended,
from the beginning, to alleviate. These four requisites must then be
,present in order to pin liability under the doctrine: (1) The person
sued must be the owner of the car. Holland v. Goode, supra; Doss v.
Monticello Electric Light and Power Co. & Myers, supra; Marsee v.
Bates, supra. (2) The automobile must be kept for family use. Euster
v. Vogel, supra. However, it may be a pleasure car even though used
-at other times for business purposes. Watson v. Burley, 105 W. Va.,
416, 143 S. E. 95 (1928); Bradley v. Schmidt, supra. (3) The vehicle
*must be used with the owner's consent at the time of the accident.
Sale v. Atkins, supra. (4) A family relationship must exist wherein
the driver of the automobile is dependent, either legally or morally,
-on the owner. Thus, a parent should be liable for the negligent ac-
•cidents of a minor unemancipated son or daughter. Thixton v. Palmer,
supra; Steel v. Age's Adm'x, supra; Wallace v. Hall, supra. Likewise,
a husband should be liable for an injury caused by his spouse. Marsee
v. Bates, supra. Reciprocally, if a wife is the owner of the car she
should be financially responsible for the tort of her husband, although
Kentucky holds otherwise. Kennedy v. Wolf, supra. She, also, should
be liable for the accident of her minor child, even though her husband
Is living. Steel v. Age's Adm'x, supra; Wallace v. Hall, supra. Ken-
tucky adheres to the correct doctrine when it refuses to hold an owner
for the Tiegligent operation of the family car by an adult child. He, in
reality, is no longer a member of the family, since there is no duty,
legal or moral, to support him. Rauckhorst v. Kraut, supra;
Bradley v. Schmidt, supra; Malcolm v. Nunn, supra; Craghead v.
Hafele's Adm', supra; United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v.
Hall, supra. However, the doctrine should extend to include a minor
stepchild. Jones v. Cook, 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S. E. 828 (1922). But it
-ahould not include a relative outside the parent and child relation.
Tullis v. Blue, 216 Ala. 577, 164 So. 185 (1927), or an employee. Mogle
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v. A. W. Scott Co., 144 Minn. 173, 174 N. W. 832 (1919), although one
case allows recovery in this instance. Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn.
447, 138 Atl. 365 A son or daughter, owning the automobile, should not
be liable under the family purpose doctrine when other members of
the family are in control of it. Hall v. Scott, 231 Ill. App. 494 (1923).
However, a parent should be responsible for the negligent driving of
a person, authorized by his minor child, or spouse, to drive on the
theory of imputed agency. Thizton v. Palmer, supra; Cohen v. Bor-
genecht, 144 N. Y. Supp. 399 (1913). The doctrine should apply whether
the member of the family is alone. Miller v. Weak, supra, or driving
other members of the family. Stowe v. Morris, supra. It should in-
clude injuries both to person and to property. Thixton v. Palmer,
supra; Steel v. Age's Adm'x, supra; Wallace v. Hall, supra.
In summary, it may be stated that the doctrine has filled a long
felt need, and should continue to be followed until ample legisla-
tion has taken its place. Since it can be supported only on public
policy and convenience it should be limited so as only to supply a
remedy for those evils it was brought forward to eradicate. Therefore,
it should be extended with caution and with trepidation, and should
apply solely to injuries caused by the family automobile.
HARRY I. STEGUAIER.
DAMAGES-LIQuIDATED DAmAGES OR PENALTY-IN CONTRACTS FOR
SALEn OF GOODS TO BE MANUFACTURED BY SELLER.
A contract for sale of flour providing liquidated damages in case
of the buyer's failure to furnish shipping instructions, on the basis
of one cent per day per barrel of flour from date of sale to date of
termination as expense for carrying plus 20 cents per barrel as cost
of selling, and plus or minus amount of difference between market
value of wheat on date of. sale, and date of termination, times 4.6 times
the number of barrels of flour, was held valid and enforceable, where
it was shown that because of fluctuation in price of wheat it was
necessary in order to stabilize the business to purchase sufficient wheat
to fill an order for flour at the time the order was taken. Quaile & Co,
v. William Kelly Milling Go. 184 Ark. 717, 43 S. W. (2d) 369, 79 A.
L. R. 183 (1931). The court said: "The general rule is that contracts
for liquidated damages, when reasonable in their character, are not to
be regarded as penalties, and may be enforced between the parties.
But agreements to pay fixed sums, plainly without relation to any
probable damage which may follow a breach, will not be enforced.
Kothe, Trustee, v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224, 50 S. Ct. 142, 72
L. Ed., 832 and Robins v. Plant, 174 Ark. 639, 297 S. W. 1027, 59 A. L. R.
1128." The courts that have been called upon to interpret such stipula-
tions for payment of a designated sum, in case of breach of a contract
for the -sale of goods to be manufactured, have without exception held
